JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES-A STUDY IN JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION by CLARK, CHARLES E. & SHULMAN, HARRY
YALE LAW JOURNAL
VOL. XLIII APRIL, 1934 No. 6
JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES-A STUDY IN
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THE jury method of trial has long been a popular subject of legal and
lay controversy.' Ever increasing congestion of court calendars, observed
instances of allegedly unjust jury verdicts, "ambulance chasing" and
other unsavory products of negligence litigation have led to increasing
protest against this historic method of trial. It has been attacked as
unduly expensive, inefficient, unjust, archaic, and unsuited to the needs
of our present civilization. On the other hand, the jury system has been
defended as intrinsically sound and highly desirable; the ills have been
attributed to abuses and causes not inevitably associated with it and
curable by appropriate remedies. Many changes have been suggested
and some adopted: abolition or restriction of the jury trial in civil
litigation or in certain types of civil litigation, decrease in the number
of jurors required to constitute a jury, acceptance of a less than unani-
mous verdict, provisions that the right to jury trial be deemed waived
unless specifically claimed, imposition of various fees and charges on
the exercise of the right, and other reforms hopefully advocated as cures.
of the alleged evils. Individual opinion, founded upon more or less
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1. Some recent discussions are Lummus, Civil Juries and the Law's Delay (1932) 17
MAss. L. Q. (No. 4) 34 (1932), 12 B. U. L. REV. 487; Wilkin, The Jury: Reformation,
Not Abolition (1930) 13 3. Ama. Jun. Soc. 154; Duane, Civil Jury Should be Abolished
(1928) 12 id. 137; Wigmore, A Program for the Trial of Jury Trial (1928) 12 id. 166;
Corbin, The Jury On Trial (1928) 14 A. B. A. J. 507; Sweet, The Jury On Trial: A Reply
(1929) 15 id. 241; Proskauer, A New Professional Psychology Essential for Law Reform
(1928) 14 id. 121, 13 Mass. L. Q. (No. 5) 2; Green, Why Trial By Jury? (1928) 15
A.m. MnRcuau 316; Elder, Trial By Jury: Is It Passing? (1928) 156 HARs,'s 570;
Duane and Windolph, Should the Civil Jury Be Abolished? (A Debate) (1928) 80
FORum 489, 498. Cf. Peterson v. Fargo-Moorhead St. Ry. Co., 37 N. D. 440, 160 N. W. 42
(1917); Ethridge, J., dissenting in Talbot & Higgins Lumber Co. v. McLeod Lumber Co.,
147 Miss. 186, 192, 113 So. 433, 434 (1927).
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observation and experience, has been the major weapon of attack or
defense. Occasionally in recent years, attempts have been made to over-
come the inherent weakness of this method of controversy by supporting
opinion with statistical facts not subject to dispute or vulnerable as guess
or prejudice. The study of law administration in the trial courts con-
ducted by the Yale School of Law since 1927 has produced much data
of interest.2 Selected material from that study bearing on the actual use
of the jury in civil cases is presented in this article.
It is, of course, obvious that certain phases of the historic institution
cannot be appraised by the statistical method. And no matter how
formidable, statistics may not prevail against opinion founded upon deep
emotional conviction. The jury has been regarded alternately as the
Saint and the Devil of the law-the safety valve which affords relaxation
from unjust rigors of the law and the imperfect material upon which may
be laid the blame for the faulty workings of the machinery. Vivid pages
of history may be read to establish the jury as our guaranty, worth what-
ever it may cost, against judicial tyranny and oppression. Statesmen
may be called to attest the value of the jury system in the assurance
which it gives of popular participation in government and law enforce-
ment. Jurisprudence may be invoked to emphasize the peculiar fitness
of the jury to vitalize legal standards of conduct so as to express the
norms or desires of the community from which it is drawn. And there is
no dearth of lawyers to testify that a jury of twelve men, good and true,
is in most cases the best possible tribunal for the trial of issues of fact.
2. This study, supported for the greater part of the time during which it was carried
on by a grant from a foundation, has included material on both civil and criminal cases
from various courts in several states; but it has centered chiefly on trends over a period
of years in a single court of general jurisdiction-the Superior Court for New Haven
County, Connecticut.
Previous papers based upon this study are Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration
(1928) 2 CoNN. BAR J. 211, 1 Mass. L. J. 324; Clark, Should Pleadings Be Filed Promptly
(1929) 3 CoNar. BAR J. 69; Clark and O'Connell, The Hartford Small Claims Court (1929.)
3 id. 123; Clark and King, Statistical Method in Legal Research (1930) 5 YALE Scr. MA0.
(No. 1) 15; Harris, Joinder of Parties and Causes (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 192; Harris,
Is the Jury Vanishing? (1930) 4 CON. BAR J. 73, 7 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 657; Shulman and
Thompson, Mortgage Foreclosures in Superior Court for New Haven County, at New
Haven, 1929-1932 (Oct. 1933) BULL. N. H. COUNTY BAR ASS'N. 4. A general report is in
preparation. For the companion study of the business of the federal courts, originally
conducted for the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement and later
under the auspices of the American Law Institute, see NATrONAL Co.naissioN ON LAW
OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMFENT REPORT No. 7, PROGREss REPORT ON THE STUDY OF THE Fm-
ERAL COURTS (1931) ; Arnold, Progress Report on Study of the Federal Courts (1931) 17 A.
B. A. J. 799; Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts (1933) 19 id.
499. Reports will be presented to the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute in May, 1934.
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The system's alleged fault is advanced as really its great merit; because
a jury is picked anew in each case, its mistakes are spent in the individual
case and do not survive as precedents to trouble it or the judge or an-
other jury in other cases. Convictions of this kind are not based on quan-
titative analyses of the facts of jury trial. Conversely, they are not easily
destroyed by such analyses. Even the more conservative middle ground,
that the right of jury trial might well be restricted but nevertheless re-
tained both as a guaranty of protection of the individual against arbitrary
official conduct and as a safeguard for judges where disputes are sharp
and decision is productive of bitterness, is not subject to statistical dein-
onstration. But the actual facts as to the use of the jury cannot fail to be
of significance. They remove many matters from the field of controversy
and sharpen the issues calling for exercise of judgment and wisdom.
While they do not insure wisdom in judgment, they illumine the bases
upon which judgment is to be formed.
II
The subject of the present study is the Superior Court of New Haven
County, sitting at New Haven, Connecticut-a trial court of general
jurisdiction. All the civil cases in this court finished in the period under
survey were investigated and tabulated. In the fourteen year period
from January 1, 1919 through December 31, 1932, there were finally
terminated 23,349 civil cases.3 In only 934 cases of this number, or 4%,.
was a jury trial had or at least begun.4 But some 45% of the total cases
3. Since Connecticut has long been a code state, this total includes, of course, cases
which, in other states, are separately tabulated as equity or chancery cases. It includes
also divorce actions. In the first part of the period, divorce actions comprised the largest
single class of cases in this total, with negligence actions next and foreclosures a close
third. In the last five years, negligence actions jumped to first place with foreclosures a
close second and divorce a poorer third. The classification of the total cases for the




Of the negligence cases, 4098, or 17.5% of the total of all cases, involved automobile
accidents. In the last four years of the period alone, the total number of cases ter-




Of the negligence actions, 2211, or 23.4% of the total cases, involved automobile acci-
dents. While divorces dropped off in the years 1929-1932, there were more negligence
and foreclosure actions in those four years than in the ten preceding years.
4. In Connecticut, a jury may be had only if properly requested by either of the
parties. Failure to make the request constitutes a waiver of the right of jury trial.
Prior to 1927 a jury trial fee of $6 was required to accompany the request. Since 1927,
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were terminated by withdrawal or discontinuance without trial. Con-
sidering, then, only the cases which were terminated by some judicial
action the number of jury trials constitutes 7% of the total. In these
totals are included, of course, cases in which a jury cannot be had as of
right. But the figures given show the very small extent of the use of
the jury as compared to the entire judicial business done by this court.'
Unless the cases in which the jury is used are of peculiar significance
despite their small number or unless the use of the jury in these cases
has an influence which pervades all the others, this method of trial
appears at once as of comparatively limited effect on the total bulk of
litigation.
The use of the jury is restricted largely to one type of action, the
negligence case. In the fourteen year period, almost three-quarters of
all the jury trials occurred in the negligence group. Automobile acci-
dent cases account for about half of the total jury trials. And this
trend seems to be accelerating. Thus in the last four years of the period,
1929 through 1932, automobile accident cases accounted for 55.1%
of all the jury trials; all negligence cases (including automobile) ac-
counted for 80.7%. Only 7.7% of all the jury trials occurred in the
breach of contract and debt types of cases.' The remaining 11.6%
of the jury trials were scattered among the various types of cases as
follows: Real Property Actions, 2 cases; Probate Appeals, 4 cases;
Fraud Actions, 6 cases; Assault and Battery, 9 cases; Slander and Libel,
5 cases; Conversion, 2 cases; Breach of Promise and Alienation of
Affections, 6 cases; Miscellaneous, 8 cases.
The frequency of the negligence actions in the total of jury trials is
out of all proportion to their frequency in the total case load or in the
total number of cases triable by jury at the pleasure of the litigants.
Thus, in the fourteen year period the total number of negligence actions
terminated in any manner and the total number of negligence actions
tried were each 1.8 as great as the corresponding totals of breach of
the jury trial fee has been $10. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 2254, 5624. The 934 jury casea
include those in which settlements were reached during trial and withdrawals or stipula-
tions entered accordingly.
5. The seeming impossibility of disposing of more than a slight fraction of all litigation
in Massachusetts by means of jury trial has led at least one eminent member of its bar
to prophesy that "the jury trial will pass of its own accord." See letter of Dunbar F.
Carpenter in (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 581. For comparative figures from other states,
see note 9, infra.
6. There were 363 jury trials in this period of four years, distributed as follows:
Breach of contract and debt-28
Automobile negligence-200
All negligence, including automobile-293
All other cases--42
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contract and debt cases. Yet the number of jury-tried negligence actions
was 6.3 as great as the corresponding number of breach of contract and
debt cases. So also, one and a third as many automobile accident cases
were terminated in any manner as were breach of contract and debt cases.
And the number of tried cases in the former type was one and a quarter
as large as in the latter; yet the number of jury trials was 4.2 as great.
This disproportion seems to be wider in the later years than in the
earlier. 7  And because traffic accident cases have been continuously
increasing, and at a more rapid pace than the other types of cases
(except mortgage foreclosures in the depression years), the annual
number of jury trials has tended to increase, as is shown in the follow-
ing table.















The data given above show the frequency of the several types of cases
in the total number of jury trials. With this may be considered the con-
verse, the frequency of jury trials in the several types of cases. Count-
ing only those cases which were terminated by a judgment after court or
jury trial, in the ten years 1919-1928, the ratios for the ten year period
are as follows:'
7. Thus, in the four years 1929-1932, the number of negligence actions terminated in any
manner (2907) was 3.1 times as large as the corresponding number of contract actions
(945); and the number of tried negligence cases (464) was 2.7 as large as the cor-
responding number of contract cases (172). Yet the number of jury trials in the former
type was 10.5 as large as in the latter. The total number of automobile accident cases
(2211) and the number tried (332) were, respectively, 2.3 and 1.9 as large as the cor-
responding numbers of contract cases (945 and 172). Yet jury trials were 7.1 as num-
erous in the former type as in the latter.
8. Because of inexperience in the collection of this data, the number of cases which
were withdrawn, settled or discontinued during or after trial or appeal were not sep-
arately counted for the ten year period, 1919-1928, and were treated in the same manner
as cases settled, withdrawn or discontinued without trial. For the four year period, 1929-
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Type of Case Total Tried with a Jury Tried without a Jury
Number Per Cent of Number Per Cent of
Total Total
Breach of Contract and Debt 354 66 18.6 288 81.4
Automobile Negligence 330 193 58.5 137 41.5
All Negligence, including Automobile 480 296 61.7 184 38.3
Other Types having both jury and
non-jury trials 383 73 19.1 310 80.9
In the other types of cases, as has been indicated, jury trials were too
few in number to merit consideration in this connection. Unlike the
situation in some other states, jury trial of negligence actions was waived
in a very substantial percentage of the cases, but was elected in a sub-
stantial majority. And, again, unlike the situation in some states, jury
trial was elected in only a small percentage of the contract cases.9
1932, the cases withdrawn or discontinued during or after trial were separately treated. For
this period the following were the ratios of jury to non-jury trials for all cases in
which trials were at least begun, regardless of whether they terminated in judgments,
withdrawals or discontinuances:
TYPE oF CASE TOTAL TRIED WInH A JuRY TRaIE WIaTHoT
A JURY
No. Per Cent No. Per Cent
.of Total of Total
Debt and Breach of Contract 172 28 16.3 144 83.7
Automobile Negligence 332 200 60.2 132 39.8
All Negligence, includ-
ing Automobile 464 293 63.1 171 36.9
Other Types having both jury
and non-jury trials 151 42 27.8 109 72.2
But while these figures are more accurate than those given in the text, it will be noted
that the ratios are not substantially changed.
9. Comparison with other states is limited by the lack of data. Judicial civil statis-
tics are still in the embryonic stage. See Marshall, Judicial Statistics in the United States
(1933) 167 ANN. Am. AcAo. 135. Even with the available data comparison is hazardous
because of lack of uniformity. But subject to the proper caution, the following com-
parative figures may be given:
The Massachusetts Judicial Council reports that for the years 1918-1932 there were
47,170 "law trials" in the Superior Court for the entire state. Of this number, 37,518
or 79% were "jury" and 9652 or 21% were "jury-waived" cases. For the county of
Suffolk in which Boston is located, 81% of the 21,938 "law trials" in the period were
"jury" cases and 19% "jury-waived." In 1933 there was a marked increase in the per-
centage of "jury waived" "law trials": for the state, the percentage rose to 38.8; for
Suffolk County, to 46.9. Nn= REPORT (1933) table facing p. 96.
The Judicial Council of Rhode Island reports the following data on the law trials, in
the Superior Court for Providence and Bristol Counties:
YEAR TOTAL No. TRIED TRIED WITH TRIE WITHOUT PER CENT WITH-
JURY JURY OUT JURY
1927 432 420 12 .27
1928 521 508 13 .24
1929 - 514 - -
1930 507 450 57 1.12
1931 563 411 152 27.
1932 590 442 148 25.
1933 483 345 138 28.57
SEVENzTH REPORT (1933) 20.
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Since a jury trial in civil cases cannot be had in Connecticut unless it
is specifically claimed and a jury fee of $10 paid by the claimant, 1° it is
instructive to investigate by whom the claim of a jury is made. For this
purpose no discrimination need be made between those cases which were
ultimately tried and those which were withdrawn or discontinued with-
out trial. In the fourteen year period, juries were claimed in 4073 cases.
In only 7.2% of these cases was the claim made by the party defendant;
in the other 92.8%, the plaintiff made the claim. Fuller information is
conveyed by the following table:
Per Cent of Total Cases in Per Cent of Total Jury
Which Jury Not Claimed Claims Made by Plaintiff
All Cases .... 11 92.8
Breach of Contract and Debt 87.1 66.5
All Negligence 41.3 97.6
In the Supreme Court of New York in the First Judicial Department there seems also to
have been a marked increase in the number of non-jury trials. The following are the
figures reported for the Trial Term in New York County (excluding inquests):
YE.AR WITH JURY WITHOUT JURY PER CENT WITH-
OUT JURY
1928 2,042 1,626 44.3
1929 1,391 1,736 55.5
1930 1,309 1,161 47.
1931 1,073 1,072 50.
1932 968 1,276 56.9
JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
N FIRsT JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT (1928) 29; id. (1929) 30; id. (1930) 30; id. (1931)
30; id. (1932) 30.
A "summary of the civil actions (other than divorce) tried on the merits" in the
district courts of Kansas follows:
YEAR WITH JURY WITHOUT JURY PER CENT WITH-
OUT JURY
1928 650 6,609 91.
1929 708 5,695 88.9
1930 693 7,159 91.2
1931 876 7,736 89.8
3933 610 11,069 94.8
KANSAS JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ANNUAL REPORT (1928) 70; id. (1929) 76; id. (1930) 76; id.
(1931) 154; id. (1933) 144. The Kansas figures are obviously not here comparable since
they apparently include the types of cases in which a jury may not be had as of right.
They have a greater bearing on the previous discussion of the ratio of jury trials to total
litigation. See note 5, supra. For more detailed classifications, but over a short period,
see MICHIGAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SECOND REPORT (1932) 70-73,
On the effect in New York of the enactment of the provision that jury trial is waived
unless affirmative demand is made therefor, N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act (1920) § 426, as amend-
ed 1927, see Clark, Fact Research in Law Administration (1928) 2 CONN. BAR J. 211, at 226,
227. For the different types of provisions with respect to waiver of jury trial, see CLARC,
CODE PLEADING (1928) 54, 67; 1 CLARK, CASES ON PLEADING AND PROCEDURE (1930) 529.
10. The fee was increased from $6 to $10 in 1927. See note 4, supra.
11. A figure is not here given because the class "All Cases" includes those in which a
claim of jury trial is not permitted.
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That the plaintiff made the claim for a jury is not, of course, conclusive
proof that the defendant did not desire a jury and would have waived
it had he had the full choice. Yet it is significant that where plaintiffs
did not elect jury trial and defendants did have full choice to do so
they availed themselves of the opportunity in so few cases. And it is
also significant that the defendants did elect jury trials in such a strik-
ingly greater percentage of the cases of the contract type than of the
negligence type. The figures do not suggest an explanation. But they
do suggest an inquiry, the answer to which can doubtless be found only
in the psychological attitude of lawyers toward juries. Perhaps the
answer is the assumed propensity of juries to sympathize with the "under-
dog," the defendant debtor playing that role in the breach of contract and
debt cases, the injured plaintiff in the negligence cases. Perhaps in the
contract and debt actions there is the additional desire to delay the pay-
ment of a debt to which there is no, or only a doubtful, defense; for, as
will be seen, jury cases are terminated much less expeditiously than are
non-jury cases. Similar tactics in the negligence cases may not be re-
sorted to as frequently by defendants for fear of the first consideration
mentioned.
II'
It is also of considerable interest to note the localities from which the
jurors are chosen. A traditional defense of the jury trial is that it
enables the vague standards of the law to be endowed with operative
meanings which will keep pace with the mores and desires of the com-
munity-a result which it is said cannot be achieved by judges presumed
to be cloistered and removed from the hurly-burly of life. Attention to
the localities from which jurors are chosen may cast light upon the
effectiveness with which this jury function is performed.
The jurors for the Superior Court are selected from the entire County
of New Haven. The City of New Haven is the county seat and the
second largest (during a part of this period, the largest) city in Con-
necticut. Surrounding the city are a number of smaller cities and rural
communities. In the following table are set forth all the cities and towns
of the county, their populations," the number of jurors contributed by
each to the juries in the cases tried to a jury in the ten year period,
1919-1928, and their rank in terms of population and number of jurors.
In preparing the table each jury panel and each petit jury in each case
12. The population figure used is the average of the figures given by the 1920 and
1930 censuses. For the purpose of the comparisons made in the table, it actually makes
little difference whether the average, the 1920 or the 1930 figure be used. See CONN.
STATE REGISTER AND MANxuA (1933) 300.
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was considered separately.13 Consequently, if, for example, one indi-
vidual from Ansonia was included in the panels for six cases and sat on
the petit juries in three cases, Ansonia was credited with six jurors in
the "Panels" column and three jurors in the "Petit Juries" column.




























00 0 0 0
;R 0 o
872 348 18,770 4.6
533 224 1,643 32.4
424 171 445 95.3
470 186 6,824 6.9
767 336 3,059 25.1
665 201 11,013 6
502 199 5,667 8.9
567 287 2,960 19.2
649 270 13,815 4.7
497 258 1,887 26.3
1,042 418 36,622 2.8
189 104 1,262 15
906 382 11,426 7.9
658 278 14,683 4.5
1,852 590 162,596 1.1
466 245 1,219 38.2
582 271 2,849 20.4
305 117 1,069 28.5
235 123 398 59
670 271 6,835 9.8
351 158 1,113 31.5
942 429 13,144 7.2
668 190 95,808 .7
119 46 845 14.1
460 181 1,400 32.9
N 00 0N0
1.9 4 21 21
13.6 17 5 6
38.4 24 1 1
2.7 11 18 IS
11 13 9 8
1.8 9 19 22
3.5 12 15 15
9.7 14 11 10
2 6 20 19
13.7 16 8 5
1.1 3 23 23
8.2 19 12 12
3.3 8 16 16
1.9 5 22 20
.36 1 24 24
20.1 20 3 3
9.5 11 10 11
10.9 22 7 9
30.9 25 2 2
4 10 14 14
14.2 21 6 4
3.3 7 17 17
.2 2 25 25
5.4 23 13 13
12.9 18 4 7
The least populous town of the county, Prospect, not only had the sec-
ond largest ratio of jurors to population, both on the panels and the petit
juries, but had a representation on the panels numerically larger than that
13. For each case in which a jury is used, the Clerk keeps a jury sheet on which are
recorded, among other things, the jurors constituting the panel, the petit jurors chosen
from the panel, the towns in which they reside and their days of service in connection
with that case. These sheets are the basis for this table and others to follow.
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of two other towns from two to three times as populous, and a represen-
tation on the petit juries numerically larger than that of three towns
from two to three times as populous. Bethany, the second smallest of the
twenty-five, had the largest ratio of jurors to population both on the
panels and on the petit juries. In both instances, its absolute numerical
representation was larger than that of four other towns approximately
two to three times its size. The largest cities in the county had the
smallest ratio of jurors to population.
The disproportionate contribution of jurors by the rural areas is
apparent even on superficial glance. If the value of juries is based on
their representation of the communities in which cases are tried, then
the above table eloquently bespeaks the denial of such representation
to large portions of the population in New Haven County and the conse-
quent lack of the condition which makes jury trial socially valuable.
The Judicial Council of Connecticut has noted "the unfairness of this
distribution and its tendency to impair the quality of the jurors finally
selected" and has urged amendment of the statutory method for the
selection of jurors which caused the above distribution.14
IV
The protest against the expense of jury trials finds ample support in
the facts. The 571 civil cases in connection with which juries were
called in the ten years 1919-1928, involved the payment of 27,321
juror fees or an average over the period of 48 juror fees per case, one
day's fee to a juror being counted as a juror fee. The average number
of juror fees per case did not fluctuate widely from year to year and
ranged from a low of 39 in 1920 to a high of 61 in 1922, with 50 as the
most frequent average. In terms of the number of jurors called from
their work and paid the jury fee, a jury trial does not involve simply the
traditional twelve men. In each of the ten years, the average number of
jurors in paid attendance for each case on the first day of trial remained
fairly constant, ranging from 17 in 1924 to 21.5 in 1926-the average for
the entire period being 20. On the second day of trial, for those cases
which had a second day, the average number of jurors in paid attendance
ranged from 16 in 1924 to 21.4 in 1921, the average for the period being
17.7. For every subsequent day of trial, the average number of jurors
in paid attendance per day continued to be well above 12. In the ten
year period, the average number of jurors who were in paid attendance
on every day on which a jury was called was 18, the average in each
year ranging from 15 in 1924 to 20.5 in 1921. The detail is given in the
following table:
14. CONNECTICUT JUDIcIAL CouNcIL, FIRST REPORT (1928) 14, 17.
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18.3 19 18.6 19
The juries in the Superior Court at New Haven are not centrally em-
panelled. Each judge holding a jury session has his own separate jury
panel. On the first day of the session the whole panel is called. After
a petit jury is chosen for the the first case, the remaining jurors, except
those who are excused for the entire term, are dismissed for the day
and instructed to return the next day or at some later time when it is
anticipated the first case will be finished and another ready for trial.
But, though not used, these jurors have earned their fees and travel
allowances for the day. When they return at the appointed time, the
case on trial may not yet have terminated. They may wait a few hours
until it appears that there is no prospect of termination that day. Again
they are excused and again they have earned their fees and allowances.
The juror fee in Connecticut is $4.15 On the basis of the above aver-
ages, the average jury fees per case in the 517 cases of the ten year period
15. It was raised from $3 in 1919. Conn. Laws 1919, c. 304.
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were $192, the figure in each year ranging from a low of $156 in 1920
to the high of $244 in 1922. And this does not include the jurors' travel
allowances. An attempt was made to ascertain from the Clerk's vouchers
the actual amounts expended in fees and travel allowances, but because
of the manner in which these records are kept, complete accuracy was not
attainable. Yet, since the possible errors are due to the omission of lost,
misplaced or overlooked vouchers, they are all errors of understatement.
The figures given in the following table are therefore the minimum
amounts which it is certain were expended.
Year Jury Fees jury Travel Allowances Total
1919 $6,845.00 $1,596.68 $ 8,441.68
1920 8,848.00 2,569.50 11,417.50
1921 7,044.00 2,073.30 9,117.30
1922 9,108.00 3,477.70 12,585.70






Total 5 yrs. $38,029.00 5 yrs. $11,436.78 10yrs. $122,400.58
Taking the number of cases in connection with which a jury was called
as previously stated and the minimum fees and travel allowance as just
set forth, the average expenditure per jury case is as follows:











Average for 10 years $214.36
The unusually small amounts for 1923 and 1924 are probably not cor-
rect and the errors are doubtless due to the probable omissions that have
been mentioned. It is safe to state that the average expense per jury
case for jury fees and travel allowances alone, in the ten years, is well
over $214. The average expense to the State per jury case is thus greater
by at least $214 than that per non-jury case. Actually the disparity is,
of course, much greater. For, in order to gauge accurately the sum by
[Vol. 43
JURY TRIAL IN CIVIL CASES
which the State's expense in a jury trial exceeds that in a non-jury trial,
there must be added to the jury fees and travel allowances the expenses
of selecting and summoning the jurors, the expense of the additional dep-
uty sheriffs engaged to attend upon the juries, the other expenditures inci-
dent to jury trial alone, and the expense caused by the longer period of
trial discussed below.
V
Against this cost of the jury system are to be weighed the results which
it achieves. The disposal of the 571 cases in the years 1919-1928 is re-
corded in the jury sheets as follows:
DISPOSITION OF CASES








Money verdicts were entered in 244 of the























cases. The size of these










This table suggests many inquiries. In some 10% of the money ver-
dicts the amount of the verdict is barely as large as the State's expendi-
tures for the services of the jurors alone. Twenty-one per cent of the
cases, if the amounts demanded corresponded with the amounts recov-
ered, would have been solely within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts
and without that of the Superior Court, which is limited to amounts over
$500. Likewise, if the amounts demanded had corresponded with the
amounts recovered, 56.2% of the cases would have been within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas, which extends to
cases involving from $100 to $2000. The table suggests the prob-
ability that limitations on jurisdictional amount are not an adequate
means of distributing judicial business among the several courts. Some
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other means, such as a unified court with a directing administrative
head, may be necessary to avoid expensive overlapping of courts.'6
Data for the four years, 1929-1932, bear out this belief. The 215
money verdicts were distributed among the several amount groups as
follows :"7
Per Cent of Total




$ ,001-2,000 44 20.5
$2,001-3,000 26 12.1
$3,001-5,000 28 13
Over $5,000 33 15.4
Total 215 100
VI
The preceding pages present the general picture of what the jury
accomplished in the years under survey and of the expenditures and
burdens involved in that accomplishment. Appraisal of this method of
trial needs, however, comparison with the other method used, trial by
court without jury. But such comparison does not lend itself easily to
mathematical statement or investigation. A mortgage foreclosure is
certainly different from a negligence action. And each negligence action
has infinite points of possible difference from all other negligence actions,
not the least ponderable being the personal characteristics and methods
of the lawyers retained to try it. Qualitative comparison of the two
methods of trial must rest ultimately on observation, personal intuition,
and individual opinion and judgment not subject to objective demonstra-
tion. In the research here reported no attempt was made to deal with the
subject-matters of the controversies beyond classifying them into gen-
eral types, or to investigate the situations presented in the cases. And
there was no attempt to form an opinion as to the merit of the disposals
made of the individual cases.' 8
16. See the discussions in The Administration of Justice (1933) 167 ANN. Am. AcAD. 1-60.
17. For similar studies of the amounts recovered, see MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
FOURTH REPORT (1928) 87, FirTE REPORT (1929) 81; MICHIGAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SEC-
OND REPORT (1932) 41.
18. The experiment along these lines of Mr. Justice McCook of the Supreme Court
of New York County is highly interesting and rather unique. While sitting at trial
term with juries he kept careful record of the verdicts, his own opinions as to the merits
of the cases, the points of difference between himself and the juries, the causes which he
believed led to the differences, the performances of counsel, and so forth. The results
of his investigation are reported in McCook, N. Y. L. J., March 2, 1928 at 2643, and
Wherry, A Study of the Organization of Litigation and of the Jury Trial in the Supreme
Court of New York County (1931) 8 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 396, 640.
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Yet quantitative comparisons of the results of the two methods of
trial involved in this study may have considerable qualitative value. The
study is confined to a single court in a single city. The period covered
is quite long, fourteen years. The number of cases considered is not
too small. And the considerations which lead parties in each case to
choose one method over the other are vague, diverse and subjective-
not determinate, uniform or objective. Perhaps, therefore, it may be
assumed that under the circumstances, the differences in the situations
between individual litigations will, by and large, be equally present in
each method of trial and will cancel each other.
From the Clerk's diaries were computed the number of days devoted
to the trial of cases by the two methods. The information thus acquired
is given in the following table. The unit employed is that of one judge
holding court one day. Thus, if on a single day one judge was trying
cases without a jury and two judges were trying cases with juries, three
days were recorded, one "court day" and two "jury days." The Short
Calendar "days" are the "Court Days," as above defined, held on Fridays,
when only motions, demurrers, foreclosures, ex parte divorces and gen-
eral uncontested cases are heard.
NUMBER or DAYS DEVOTED To TRIAL
C40
C* I
0 0 _ 8P-I toz n .
--. . -. O ,
1919 261 223 146 108 115 44% 52%
1920 296 240 185 129 110 35% 46%
1921 290 239 197 146 93 32% 39%
1922 319 266 213 160 106 33% 40%
1923 346 287 214 155 132 38% 46%
1924 323 270 185 132 138 43% 51%o
1925 359 301 225 167 134 37% 45%
1926 314 264 185 135 129 41% 49%
1927 368 315 191 139 176 48% 56%
1928 ... ... ... ...... ....
1929 406 351 214 159 192 47% 55%
1930 417 369 197 149 220 53% 60%
1931 ..... ... ........ ....
1932 477 428 177 128 300 63% 70%
Total 4176 3554 2330 1707 1846 44% 52%
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As has been previously noted, jury participation was limited to only
7%o of the total number of cases terminated by some judicial action. Yet,
as shown in the above table, 44% of the total "days" were devoted to
jury trials. But this comparison overlooks even the obvious differences
between the general types of cases. It is clearly improper to compare
for this purpose uncontested divorce or foreclosure actions, which are
speedily disposed of on short calendar, with contested contract or tort
cases. The available data does not permit comparison in the several
types of cases separately. Yet the generality of the above comparison
may be considerably narrowed. Counting only those types of cases in
which there were both jury and non-jury trials, and excluding short cal-
endar judgments and therefore also short calendar days, 934 cases were
disposed of with jury participation as against 1206 without jury partici-
pation. Thus in the same general class of cases the court disposed of one
and a quarter as many cases as did the jury in nine-tenths of the "days"
required by the jury, in addition to its disposal of between one and two
times as many other cases of types in which there were no jury trials.
A comparison of the time intervals that elapsed between the com-
mencement and termination of cases disposed of by court and jury trial
is also favorable to the former. Thus, of the automobile negligence
cases tried to a judge without a jury, in the ten year period, 96% were
terminated within three years after commencement, 92% within two
years, 58% within one year, 22% within six months and 5% within three
months. The corresponding percentages for the jury-tried cases of this
same type are 90%, 81%, 53%, 22% and 2.5%. For negligence cases
other than automobile, the respective percentages are 96o, 82%, 53%,
18% and 10%, as against 82%, 71%, 44%, 14% and 1%.
The record of appeals further weighs heavily against the jury method
of trial. The frequency of appeals and the frequency of reversals on
appeal are considerably much greater in the jury cases than in those of
the same types tried without a jury. In the years 1929-1932, for example,
appeals were taken in 35 negligence cases out of 293 tried to juries;
while of the 171 negligence cases tried to the court, only 5 were appealed.
Of the 35 jury cases 13 were reversed; while of the 5 court cases, one was
reversed. Similarly, of the 28 contract and debt cases tried to juries, 6
were appealed and 5 of them reversed; while of the 144 cases tried to the
court, 12 were appealed and 4 reversed. Taking all the cases in these
four years without differentiation as to types, appeals were prosecuted in
115 cases, of which 52 had been tried to juries and 63 to the court. Re-
versals in the court cases numbered 18, or 28.6% of the court cases ap-
pealed. In the jury cases, the reversals numbered 21, or 40.4% of the
jury cases appealed. In the ten year period the contract and debt cases
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appealed numbered 42, 28 court and 14 jury cases. Of the court cases 6,
or 21.4%, were reversed. Of the jury cases 7, or 50%, were reversed.
In the negligence group, 13 court cases were appealed with 4, or 30.8%,
resulting in reversal; and 68 jury cases were appealed with reversals
resulting in 23, or 33.8%. There were 135 appeals in cases of the vari-
ous types other than those mentioned. Of these, 116 were court cases
and 19 were jury. Of the court cases, 34, or 29.3%, were reversed.
Of the jury cases, 9, or 47.4%, were reversed. Considering the total
number of appeals in all the types together, there were reversals in 28%
of the appealed court cases and in 38.6% of the appealed jury cases."
Comparison of the court and jury cases with respect to the winning
party and the amount of the verdict in the money judgment cases is,
of course, more hazardous than the comparisons made above. The figures
reflect none of the data which differentiate case from case, except the
broad type. The general comparison may be presented, however, for
whatever value it may have.
No. of No. of Percentage
Judgments Judgments Total of Judgments
for Plaintiff for Defendant judgments for Plaintiff
Court Jury Court jury Court Jury Court Jury
Breach of Contract 287 54 92 26 379 80 75.7 67.5
and Debt
Automobile Negligence 160 247 95 120 255 367 62.7 67.3
All Negligence, 197 324 141 202 338 526 58.3 61.6
including Automobile
The above figures cover the entire fourteen years. In the last four years
the spread between the percentages of plaintiffs' judgments was greater.
Thus, in the three types of actions mentioned, and calculated on the same
basis as in the above table, the plaintiffs obtained judgments in 66.3%,
19. See NEW YORK LAW SOCIETY, SorE ASPECTS or APPEALS (1934) where 186 money
judgments appealed from the Supreme Court of New York County, First Department, in
1930 are analyzed and a calculation made that the percentage of appeals to total judg-
ments in the jury cases of that year was 143% while the corresponding percentage for the
non-jury cases was 70.7%. The latter percentage is so high as to seem incredible. Perhaps
the short cut used to find the base of total judgments unfortunately resulted in error. But
no such doubt surrounds the statement that in the appeals mentioned, the judgment be-
low was affirmed in 74.2% of the jury cases and in 70.7% of the non-jury cases. Compare,
however, MASSACHUS TS JUDICIAL COUNCIL, EIGHTU RFPORT (1932) 64: "An examina-
tion of the results of the review by the Supreme Judicial Court of rulings by the Superior
Court for the five-year period 1927-1931 inclusive, applying the severe test that any
modification of the action of the Superior Court shall be considered a reversal, shows that
the Superior Court was sustained in its rulings to the extent following:
In workmen's compensation cases-69.44%
In civil jury cases-72.20%
In civil cases without a jury, including interlocutory rulings--77.81%."
19341
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60.7% and 58.6%o respectively of the court cases, while the correspond-
ing figures for the jury cases were 72.7%, 71.5% and 65.5%.1o It is
interesting to compare these figures with those previously set forth
anent the party who claims the right of jury trial. The plaintiffs'
greater willingness to waive the right in contract cases than in negligence
actions finds some basis in their record of victories in the two types
of cases.
VII
This report is presented not to prove a thesis about the jury, but
to indicate the possibilities and suggest inquiries. Perhaps, however,
a brief comment may be permitted. Whatever the political, psycho-
logical or jurisprudential values of the jury as an institution may
be, its use in the civil litigation covered by this study is certainly not
impressive. The picture seems to be that of an expensive, cumbersome
and comparatively inefficient trial device employed in cases where ex-
ploitation of the situation is made possible by underlying rules. Per-
suasive reasons are found in the facts set forth for the definite limita-
tion of the right of jury trial to the role of safety valve; and for the
greater use of the summary judgment in the debt cases,2 the require-
ment of substantial jury trial fees,22 and the reduction in the number
of jurors required for a petit jury to nine or even six.2 3
But it is possible that a different and additional change may come as
20. For interesting comparative data in other states, see MASSACHUSETTS JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, EIGHTH REPORT (1932) 12-14; MICHIGAN JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SECOND REPORT
(1932) 63.
21. Finch, Summary Judgment Procedure (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 504; Clark and
Samenow, The Summary Judgment (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 423; Cohen and Shinentag,
Summary Judgments in the Supreme Court of New York (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 825; Sa.xe,
Summary Judgments in New York-a Statistical Study (1934) 19 CONN. L. Q. 237. Cf. the
English New Procedure of 1932. Davies, The English New Procedure (1933) 42 YALE L. J.
377; Millar, The "New Procedure" of the English Rules (1932) 27 ILL. L. REv. 363.
22. In its last two reports, the Massachusetts Judicial Council has recommended a
jury trial fee for the relief -of the very serious congestion in the Superior Courts of that
State, particularly in Suffolk County. NINTH REPORT (1933) 18; EIGHTH REPORT (1932) 18.
For a table of jury trial fees required in the several states, see RHODE IsLAND JUDICIAL
COUNCIL, FIFTH REPORT (1931) 28. The Rhode Island Council, also, has recommended
a jury trial fee. Id. at 19; SEvENTH REPORT (1933) 8. On the effect in New York of the
requirement of a jury fee, see Tuttle, Reforms in Federal Procedure (1928) 14 A. B. A. J.
37, 41; Clark, supra note 9.
23. The Judicial Council of Rhode Island has recommended an optional form of de-
crease with a jury trial fee as an inducement; that is, a requirement of a fee for a jury
of twelve and no fee for a jury of sx-the choice resting with the parties. F-H REPORT
(1931) 20. The Connecticut Judicial Council has recommended a constitutional amend-
ment authorizing the legislature to fix the number of jurors below twelve. Pending adoption
of such an amendment, it advised the judges to adopt a rule of court which would provide
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an incident of a separate and more revolutionary reform. In the court
studied, as elsewhere in the country, the jury has become identified in
very major part with automobile accident litigation. Much dissatisfac-
tion has been expressed with this method of administering compensa-
tion for such accidents. After extended study, a distinguished commit-
tee has suggested that compensation for automobile accidents be re-
moved from the sphere of litigation and be administered by an adminis-
trative tribunal on the basis of liability regardless of fault, in the manner
in which compensation for industrial accidents is administered.24 Such
legislation would make the number of jury trials entirely insignificant.
that a claim of a jury trial would be interpreted as referring to a jury of six unless otherwise
expressly specified by the party in his claim. THIRD REPORT (1932) 7; SECOND REPORT (1931)
15.
A unique device peculiarly applicable in Massachusetts, in view of its compulsory motor
vehicle insurance law, has been recommended by its Judicial Council-a statute making
the waiver of jury trial by a plaintiff in suits for personal injuries resulting from automo-
bile accidents a condition precedent to his right to realize upon the compulsory liability
insurance policy carried by the defendant. As a check upon defendants and their insurance
carriers, a substantial jury trial fee is suggested for claims by the defendants of jury trials
in cases in which the plaintiffs have waived them. EIGHTHr REPORT (1932) 19; NINTH
REPORT (1933) 19.
24. REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION TOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS
(1932); FRENCH, THE AUTOMOBILE COMPENSATION PLA (1933). See MASSACHUSETTS
JUDICIAL COUNCIL, EIGHTH REPORT (1932) 22.
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